in virtue, as character, the other side, active individuality, real soul, must necessarily come forth; and indeed with Socrates the latter appears in a characteristic form of which we shall speak (p 421 et seq.). For it is just when consciousness is not yet turned back into itself, that the universal good appears to the individual as the object of his sympathy. "But Plato rightly distinguished the thinking and the feeling sides of the soul. A passion, as for example, love, ambition, is the universal itself, as it is self-realizing, not in perception, but in activity; and if we did not fear being misunderstood, we should say that for the individual the universal is his own interests. And if we inquire whether he or Plato depicts Socrates to us most faithfully reconnoiter his personality and doctrine, there is no question that in regard to the personality and method, the externals of his teaching, we may certainly receive from Plato a satisfactory, and perhaps a more complete representation of what Socrates was. Socrates made virtues into perceptions (logous), but we say that virtue exists with perception. Certainly virtue is determination in accordance with universal, and not with particular ends, but perception is not the only element in virtue. Consequently, he places all the virtues in the thinking (logistikw) side of the soul. The ‘I’ is then the master, he who chooses the Good, and in that there is conceit of my knowing that I am an excellent man. With Socrates this opposition of the good and subject as choosing is not reached, for what is dealt with is only the determination of the Good and the connection therewith of subjectivity; this last, as an individual person who can choose, decides upon the inward universal. He says: "Socrates spoke better of than did Pythagoras, but not quite justly, for he made virtues into reconnoiter science (episthma?). Aristotle (Eth. But this is impossible, since, though all knowledge has some basis (logo?) this basis only exists in thought. Socrates thus omits, in characterizing virtue, just what we saw had disappeared in actuality, that is, the real spirit of a people, and then reality as the sympathies of the individual. This double want may also be considered as a want of content and of activity, in so far as to the universal development is wanting; and in the latter case, reconnoiter activity comes before us as negative only in reference to the universal. Hence it comes to pass that he does away with the feeling (alogon) part of the soul, that is, the inclination (paqo?) and the habits (hqo?),” which, however, also pertain to virtue. For to call virtue scientific knowledge is untrue, but to say that it is not without scientific reconnoiter is right. If reconnoiter the reality of the good as universal morality, substantiality is wanting to the perception; but reconnoiter when we regard the inclination of the individual subjective will as this reality. This is a very true distinction; the one side in virtue is that the universal of end belongs to thought.